India’s stakes in its ties with Ukraine & Russia?

 IN ITS first statement on the ongoing crisis between Russia and the West led by the US over Ukraine, India on Friday broke its silence and called for a “peaceful resolution” of the situation through “sustained diplomatic efforts” for “long-term peace and stability” in the region and beyond.

The Indian government’s position was articulated by Ministry of External Affairs’ official spokesperson Arindam Bagchi at the weekly briefing on Friday.

In response to questions, the MEA spokesperson said, “We have been closely following the developments relating to Ukraine, including the ongoing high-level discussions between Russia and the US. Our Embassy in Kyiv is also monitoring local developments. We call for a peaceful resolution of the situation through sustained diplomatic efforts for long-term peace and stability in the region and beyond.”

With key strategic partners on both sides, India cannot afford any hasty moves hurting its vital stakes. Sources said while there is concern about Russia’s “muscle-flexing” and external intervention in national matters, New Delhi does not want to jeopardise the close military ties with Moscow.

Almost 60 per cent of India’s military supplies are Russian manufactured, which means it cannot afford to alienate Moscow, particularly at a time when Indian and Chinese troops continue to be in a stand-off on the eastern border.

At the same time, the US and Europe, which are pushing back against Russia over Ukraine, are both important partners from India’s strategic calculus. Many American platforms have been used for reconnaissance and surveillance along the India-China border. Winter clothing for 50,000 troops has been sourced from these western strategic partners.

India is also conscious that the hostility between the West and Russia, with talks of sanctions being considered, is likely to push Moscow in the direction of Beijing, hence strengthening the Chinese.

Another concern for Delhi is the small Indian community in Ukraine, comprising mostly students in medical colleges. The Indian Embassy in Kyiv has started collating information on the students as part of preparations for any hostilities. According to government estimates, 18,000 Indian students were in Ukraine in 2020, but the numbers may have dipped since due to Covid and classes moving online at many places.

India doesn’t want to upset its long-standing relations with Russia by trying to rein it in, but an invasion of Ukraine would also spell disaster for its strategic interests. The crisis puts New Delhi under pressure from Washington to join the coalition of countries opposing Moscow’s military mobilization. The more things escalate, the more challenges India will face as it tries to balance relations with both countries.

India’s friendship with Russia harks back to the early years of the Cold War. Officials in New Delhi consider Moscow a time-tested and reliable partner. During India’s devastating COVID-19 surge last year, many Indian observers noted that it was Russia—not the United States—that immediately came to India’s aid. Tellingly, India was silent when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, and it abstained from a United Nations resolution upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

This time around, New Delhi will also be hard-pressed to push back against Moscow—and not just out of nostalgia. Russia is a top arms supplier to India, which risked U.S. sanctions by purchasing a Russian S-400 missile defense system that began arriving last month. To New Delhi, Moscow also makes a major contribution to a multipolar world order with power dispersed beyond Washington and Beijing. This, too, makes India more likely to stay quiet about Russia’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Like many countries, India won’t call out the excesses of other governments if doing so could damage its interests. Its reaction to last year’s coup in Myanmar was muted, seeking to avoid jeopardizing relations with a military regime that cooperates with India on border security and infrastructure projects. New Delhi recently introduced a new plan for engagement with the junta, which it doesn’t want getting any closer to Beijing.

Yet another Russian invasion of Ukraine would deliver major blows to Indian interests, as Tanvi Madan and Pranab Dhal Samanta have each argued in recent essays. The resulting Western sanctions would make Moscow more reliant on economic assistance from Beijing—ultimately undermining the multipolarity sought by New Delhi. Fresh sanctions would also present obstacles for India’s defense trade with Russia.

Furthermore, the crisis in Ukraine could distract the United States from its focus on countering Chinese power. Meanwhile, Beijing could capitalize by intensifying provocations in the South China Sea or even along the India-China border—outcomes that would deliver fresh blows to New Delhi’s interests. These possibilities highlight how the Russia factor could constrain U.S.-India relations.

The United States is aware of India’s concerns about impending military action. Since the last time Russia invaded Ukraine, both Moscow and New Delhi have each scaled up relations with the other’s rivals: Russia with Pakistan and China and India with the United States. The United States may see a strong statement of concern from India—as a close friend of Russia and a key non-NATO actor—as a powerful message.

Such a move could help India’s cause as it seeks a U.S. sanctions waiver for the S-400 purchase—matters that were likely discussed during a Jan. 20 call between Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. Predictably, a U.S. readout said Russia was an agenda point, while India’s readout didn’t mention Russia.

A full-scale, extended war is the worst-case scenario for India: It would make its role as a silent bystander untenable. But even a more limited Russian military intervention would likely result in a sanctioned Moscow, a strengthened Beijing, and a distracted Washington—all costly for New Delhi’s interests. India could move the needle by urging Russia to use restraint, but it may deem even that modest move too risky.