The return of upper-caste politics

 CONTEXT:

1. Hindu nationalism is generally defined as an ethno-religious movement. But it may have as much to do with social factors as with identity markers, as its last phase of expansion has been primarily a reaction to Mandal. 
2. During the implementation of the Mandal Commission (PM: VP Menon), it was felt that there is an urgent need to build up moral and spiritual forces to counter any fallout from an expected Shudra revolution.
3. And when Mandal II happened, it was argued that the then ruling government is bent upon destroying the last bastion of merit…
4. In such scenario, it became urgent to hone a strategy that would enable Rightists to come to power and prevent the deepening of policies that went against its Hindu nationalist ideology and the interests of its base.

 

NATIONAL-POPULISM:

1. The brand of national-populism that present Central government had initiated in Gujarat was the perfect alternative.
2. It could transcend caste barriers in the name of an existential defence of Hindus against threatening Others (by resorting to polarisation techniques) and attract OBCs and even Dalits, not only because of the polarisation but also because of the plebeianisation of the Rightists, which used to be identified with the upper castes until then.
3. OBCs feel that they have been victimised by the English-speaking establishment. After all, many of them had started to emancipate themselves after Mandal, but they had not succeeded in joining the middle class.

 

UPPER CASTES MPs:

1. The Rightists already had the support of the urban, upper-caste middle class, brought to the party the OBC plus vote.
2. The percentage of OBCs who supported the party jumped from 22 per cent in 2009 to 34 per cent in 2014 and 44 per cent in 2019. These figures explain the comeback of upper-caste politicians.
3. In the Hindi belt, 45 per cent of the Rightists MPs were upper caste in 2014 and 2019. This over-representation of the upper castes was reflected in the Rightists ticket distribution.
4. If one removes SC and ST candidates from the picture, 62 per cent of all general category MP candidates of the Rightists in the Hindi belt were upper castes as against 37 per cent for all other parties’ combined.
5. In the government formed in 2019, 47 per cent of the 55 ministers were from the upper castes, 13 per cent from the dominant castes (including Jats, Patels and Reddys), 20 per cent were OBCs, 11 per cent were SCs and 7 per cent from the STs (plus one Muslim and one Sikh).

 

TRANSFORMATION IN RESERVATION:

1. First, the erosion of the public sector has resulted in a steady decrease in the number of jobs reserved for SCs.
2. At the same time, the number of civil service candidates shortlisted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) dropped by almost 40 per cent between 2014 and 2018, from 1,236 to 759.
3. Second, the creation of a lateral entry in the Indian administration has diluted the quota system.
4. Third, the introduction of a 10 per cent quota in 2019 for the economically weaker sections (EWS) has altered the standard definition of backwardness and de facto reserved such a quota to upper castes who were not that weak. (By setting an income limit of Rs 8,00,000 per annum to qualify under EWS, the government has made over 95 per cent of the upper castes eligible for this quota).

 

CASTE DIFFERENTIATION:

1. Besides, Rightists leaders have started to eulogise the moral superiority of the upper caste in public. For instance, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, declared: “Brahmin community always works towards guiding all other communities… hence, Brahmins are held in high regard in society by the virtue of their birth.”
2. Rightists leaders have also displayed caste-based observances that reflected their belief in the notion of impurity.
3. After the election of present Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Hindu priests made elaborate arrangements for purifying rituals at the sprawling chief minister’s bungalow that had been previously occupied by previous CMs of the state.
4. While vigilante campaigns launched against “love jihad” targeted Muslims, lower castes have been collateral casualties. Similarly, “gau rakshaks” also attacked Dalits who did leather work. 
5. Vigilante groups played a similar role vis-à-vis the conversion of Hindu Dalits to another religion. The ghar wapasi movement also affected them.
6. But the inclinations of the state find expression not only in laws and ordinances but even in the conduct of the police. This evolution is well illustrated by the way Dalits have been singled out in the state’s action against so-called “urban Naxals”. 

 

CONCLUSION:

1. The Rightists’s rise to power may, therefore, result, not only in a post-Mandal counter-revolution that has enabled upper-caste politics and policies to stage a comeback but also in the promotion of some upper-caste orthopraxy and ethos via state vigilantism.
2. The new dispensation exemplifies a style of control that is as much based on political power as on the enforcement of social order.