India-China: the Line of Actual Control

Key Facts:-

• The ongoing military standoffs between India and China at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Details:

• The article discusses the various aspects of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which seems to be complicating the border disputes between the two Asian neighbors.
• Undemarcated borders:
• The alignment of the LAC has never been agreed upon, and it has neither been delineated nor demarcated.
• There is no official map in the public domain that depicts the LAC. The current understanding of the LAC reflects the territories that are, at present, under the control of each side, pending a resolution of the boundary dispute.
• The difference in claims:
• For the most part, in the western sector, the LAC broadly corresponds with the border as China sees it. However, India and China do not agree on the alignment of the LAC everywhere.
• Differences in perception, particularly in 13 spots in the western, middle and eastern sectors of the border, often lead to what is called “face-offs”, when patrols encounter each other in these grey zones that lie in between the different alignments. Some of these areas are Chumar, Demchok, and the north bank of the Pangong lake in the western sector, Barahoti in the middle sector, and Sumdorong Chu in the east.
• Failure of protocols and agreements:
• Both India and China have agreed to protocols in 2005 and 2013 that describe the rules of engagement to handle border stand-offs, but as the current stand-off at Pangong Tso reminds us, they haven’t always been followed.
• India and China signed the landmark Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993, the first legal agreement that recognized the LAC. However, this landmark agreement too did not precisely demarcate the LAC.
• Both the 1993 BPTA agreement and the subsequent agreement on confidence-building measures in 1996 acknowledged that both sides would ultimately clarify the LAC. That process has, however, stalled since 2002, when China walked away from exchanging maps in the western sector.
• Unintended consequences:
• The unqualified reference to the LAC created the unintended side effect of further incentivizing the forward creep to the line by the Chinese military, a consequence that both sides are currently dealing with at multiple points on the LAC.
• Chinese tactics:
• China has in several territorial disputes, intentionally left its claims ambiguous.
• The Chinese haven’t stuck to their previously agreed positions. China’s alignments of the LAC have kept changing.
• The border skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control seem to be indicative of the Chinese approach to use the border problem to pressurize India on other issues.

• Way forward:

  • Given the current circumstances, India should strategize an action plan aimed towards protecting its sovereign interests.
  • Prepare militarily:
  • India needs to be prepared, continue to build roads, and improve the infrastructure along the border, to keep itself ready to deal with any contingency.
  • Shifting focus:
  • To counter China India must look for options beyond LAC.
  • The South China Sea/Indian Ocean Region maritime domain presents India with the best options where the regional geopolitical context is favorable.
  • India should demonstrate that it is willing and capable of influencing the maritime balance in East Asia, where China faces off a combination of the United States, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, and sometimes Malaysia and the Philippines as well.
  • China perceives a vulnerability in the Malacca strait given its marked dependence on the sea lanes of communication for its vast trade and energy imports.
  • Going global:
  • India should go global to defend against China. India’s counter to Chinese power in the Himalayas should be to assume a more global role of its own.
  • In Asia and Africa, debt-traps induced by the BRI are gradually stoking discontent. If India focuses on leveraging its advantages as a development partner, particularly in the post-COVID-19 era, it can use its newfound influence as a bargaining chip against Chinese interests in these countries.
  • Building alliances:
  • India must build power-balancing alliances.
  • Many countries are seeking leadership from other quarters to counter-balance Chinese influence. In Southeast Asia, countries are pushing back against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.
  • This provides an opportunity to build partnerships with such countries to balance China’s growing influence.
  • India can give itself leverage against China by improving its bilateral relationships with other countries that are similarly worried about China’s growing influence — such as Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and even the U.K.
  • Aligning with the United States:
  • A closer alignment with the U.S. represents India’s opportunity to counter China, while efforts to foster regional partnerships and cultivate domestic military capabilities, although insufficient by themselves, could play a complementary role.
  • Moving into a closer partnership with the US would allow India an opportunity to rebalance the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Pressure points:
  • India could choose to leverage the sensitivity of the Chinese to the one-China policy and other vulnerabilities like Tibet issue and Hongkong protests, to force a change in China’s attitude.
  • This would allow India to signal to China that it has options and that China would be wise not to escalate these situations too far.

  Conclusion:

  • India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to take an active stand. Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in military power, resort must be sought in
  • This would force China to reconsider its tactics and force it towards negotiations with India.

  Source: The Hindu